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Recovering from the Constitutional 
Failure  
An Analysis of the EU Reflection Period 
Introduction 
After the rejection of the European Union’s (EU) Constitutional Treaty in 
Spring 2005 by both France and the Netherlands, the heads of state and 
government called for a “reflection period” to provide opportunities to re-
solve constitutional difficulties, and to further engage Member State citizen 
populations, national parliaments and political parties. The ultimate aim 
was to provide sufficient time for Member States to further the Constitu-
tional debate and garner enough support to continue the ratification proc-
ess. Initially, the reflection period had not been intended to last longer than 
a year, but in June 2006 the European Council outlined a timeline to reach 
a solution, extending the deadline until the end of 2008.  
Through a six-part analysis, this paper will examine how the European Un-
ion used its self-imposed “reflection period” to overcome the constitutional 
deadlock. To begin, the paper will provide a historical overview, including 
origins of the Constitutional Treaty and the initial signs of tribulations dur-
ing the referenda process. Given the significance of the treaty rejections in 
France and the Netherlands, the second part of this paper devotes special 
attention to public opinion polls and attempts to identify the motivations of 
French and Dutch voters in their decisions to vote “no.” In the third part, 
this paper takes a closer look at the three main EU institutions, European 
Commission, European Parliament and European Council, and attempts to 
illustrate the actions that were taken in response to their call to “reflect.” 
This section also briefly describes Member States’ activities during this 
time. These include various strategies to ensure EU institutions remain both 
accountable and reliable and establish a long-lasting link between the Un-Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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ion and its citizens. An overview of several academic contributions to the 
reflection period debate is presented in the fourth section. Research activi-
ties related to this discussion are presented in summary form from a selec-
tion of key European research institutes. In the fifth section of analysis, the 
EU Council Presidency debates are addressed. This section attempts to 
highlight the discrepancies that existed between the public debate and the 
negotiations occurring behind the “closed doors” of Member State govern-
ments. As the Lisbon Treaty (i.e. Reform Treaty) was the result of this 
government bargaining process, the sixth and final section of this paper 
summarizes the content of the Lisbon Treaty and provides a short compari-
son of its changes to the modifications envisaged in the Constitutional 
Treaty.   
Historical context 
In its more than 50-year history, the EU has faced several decisive mo-
ments which have affected the nature and scope of its institutions and struc-
ture. Following the ratification of the Treaty of Nice in 2001, there had 
been a desire among European political elites to tackle several problems 
which were left unresolved. Thus the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”) was created with the aim of increasing 
democracy, transparency and efficiency, simplifying the Union’s instru-
ments and clarifying competences. The outcome of this effort was perhaps 
one of the most striking moments in EU integration history to date— the 
treaty was rejected in two founding Member States by a popular vote, 
which launched a major political crisis in Europe and raised skepticism 
over citizens’ support for further European integration.  
Indeed, the event proved to be a severe setback and even evoked uncer-
tainty among some of the strongest proponents of European integration. 
Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker conceded: “Europe no 
longer makes people dream.”
1 Despite the Constitutional Treaty being suc-
 
1   Jean-Claude Juncker commented on the rejection with: 'Europe ne fait plus rêver 
parce que le projet européen est devenu diffus et parce que la partie noble du mes-
sage –'Europe artisan de paix – ne parle plus au cœur des jeunes et représente, pour Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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cessfully ratified by eighteen other Member States representing 54 % of the 
European population, the French and Dutch ‘No’ votes, coupled with con-
cerns expressed by the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic, 
had brought the ratification process to a screeching halt.  
In the wake of these developments, European political leaders scrambled to 
find a way to save the treaty. Subsequently, a self-imposed “period of re-
flection, clarification and discussion”
2 was introduced with an aim to pro-
vide opportunities for the EU to resolve constitutional difficulties, engage 
Member State citizen populations, and provide a more democratic and in-
clusive review of new provisions and concepts laid out in the treaty. 
The Origins of the Constitutional Treaty 
In order to understand these developments, first it is necessary to analyze 
the origins of the Constitutional Treaty and the reasons for its failure. As 
Robert Schuman had already observed accurately in his declaration that, 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. 
It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto 
solidarity.”
3 Accordingly, the institutions and powers of the EU have been 
developed step by step over time, with each stage of integration widening 
or deepening the scope of the EU in a particular area, focused on a particu-
lar set of goals or aims.
4 Thus, proposals can be made in one round of 
 
les plus âgés, un rêve consommé.“ BBC News 02.06.05, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
world/europe/4601609.stm (retrieved on 30.11.07). And Interview, “L'Europe ou 
l'absence de désir. Jean-Claude Juncker fait le bilan de l'année 2005”, La Libre Bel-
gique, 29.12.05.  
2    Press Release of the Luxembourg Presidency, “Jean-Claude Juncker states that 
there will be a period for reflection and discussion but the process to ratify the Con-
stitutional Treaty will continue without further renegotiations”, 17.06.05, 
www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiques/2005/06/16jclj-ratif/index.html (retrie-
ved on 30.11.07). 
3   Robert Schuman, “Declaration of 9 May 1950, leading to the creation of the Euro-
pean Union.” Full text of the declaration can be found at: http://europa.eu/ 
abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm  
4   The founding treaties include the Treaty of Paris (signed in 1951 establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community), and the two Treaties of Rome, 1957 (one es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and the other the European 
Economic Community). The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC has been sub-Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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treaty revisions, excluded from the final agreement, and carried over to the 
next round of discussions. This “left over and carry over” trend is mani-
fested well in the Constitutional Treaty as many of its key elements were 
leftovers from previous treaty negotiation periods. 
One of the leftovers concerned the capacity of the EU to handle a future 
enlargement and stressed the need for an overhaul of EU institutions in or-
der to maintain sustainability and workability. This reform element had 
been previously rooted in a 1990’s agreement among governments and was 
later carried over to the Nice Summit in 2001.
5 
A second key element of the Constitutional Treaty intended to amend the 
institutional voting structure of the Union and had originated during a 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The provision concerned the number 
of Commissioners and outlined a Council voting system which created new 
weights and voting thresholds (i.e. Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)). The 
Treaty of Amsterdam had excluded these voting schemes in favor of other 
areas of reform, namely the establishment of a greater sense of citizenship 
and the role of individuals, an increase in institutional powers for the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP), and the beginnings of a Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP) for Europe.  
While positive amendments were made in both the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties, several institutional issues remained unresolved. In particular, the 
treaties failed to address the basic question of institutional reform needed to 
prepare for the expected eastward enlargement in 2004.
6 These issues were 
addressed by the Laeken Declaration of 10 December 2001, which adopted 
a commitment to making the EU more democratic, transparent and effi-
cient. The Declaration also established the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, which drafted the Constitutional Treaty and a Charter of Human 
 
stantially revised in the Single European Act (signed 1986), Maastricht Treaty (or 
Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992), Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997) 
and the Nice Treaty (signed in 2001).  
5   R. Baldwin, “2006 Trail to Failure: History of the Constitutional Treaty's Rejection 
and Implications for the Future”, CEPS Policy Brief (104), p. 4.  
6   May 1, 2004 (Fifth Enlargement)—The enlargement comprised the largest number 
of countries admitted to the European Union at one time: Cyprus, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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Rights. Chaired by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the 
Convention included 105 members, comprised of European and national 
parliamentarians, representatives of national governments and the Commis-
sion, as well as observers from candidate states.
7 It met regularly over a 
sixteen-month period “to consider key issues arising for the Union’s future 
development and attempt to identify various possible responses”
8 to the 
challenges the Union faced. On 18 June 2004, the Intergovernmental Con-
ference agreed on the final text and called it the Treaty Establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe. The EP voted overwhelmingly in favor of the treaty in 
a non-binding, but highly politically symbolic move. The Treaty was ex-
pected to be ratified by each Member State, thus providing a legally bind-
ing element. But no one had anticipated that significant portions of the 
population held strong reservations over the future of European integration.  
The Beginning of Constitutional Treaty Tribulations  
Spain was the first country to adopt the Treaty by referendum in February 
2005 and by the end of May 2005 several other Member States had fol-
lowed suit (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 
Malta, and Slovenia). But in late spring that year, French and Dutch voters 
rejected the treaty with 54.7 % voting “Non” and 61.5% voting “Nee”.
9 
The main reasons for the rejections concerned dissatisfaction with their na-
tional political leadership and the feeling that their voices were not being 
heard at the EU level (see section 2 for additional details). Despite the un-
expected referenda glitch, Luxemburg, Malta and Latvia strongly supported 
a continuation of the ratification process.
10 However, shortly after the 
 
7   Cf. European Convention. http://european-convention.eu.int/organisation.asp? 
lang=DE. 
8   European Communities, “Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union” 
15.12.01. The Declaration can be found at www.european-convention.eu.int/ 
pdf/LKNEN.pdf (retrieved on 30.03.08). 
9   EU – CONSENT, “Wider Europe, Deeper Integration?” Constructing Europe Net-
work, 2006, p.61. Paper can be found at www.eu-consent.net/library/deliverables/ 
D11.pdf (retrieved on 30.03.08).  
10  Declaration 30 stated that if by November 1, 2006 no more than four fifths of the 
member states (20 members) had ratified the Constitutional Treaty, the matter 
would be referred to the European Council for further examination. Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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French and Dutch ‘No’ votes, several other Member States (i.e. Finland, 
Denmark, Portugal, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Re-
public) postponed their referenda, indicating that the situation had become 
quite serious.  
Reasons for the Negative Referenda 
As previously indicated, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty came rather 
unexpectedly. Both voter turnout rates for the referenda were quite high 
(69.34% in France and 63.6. in the Netherlands) and the results were clear: 
in France 54.7 % of voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty and in the 
Netherlands, as much as 61.5%. 
Direct criticism of the Constitutional Treaty played the least important role 
in its rejection.
11 However, disenchantment with domestic issues was not 
the only cause for the negative votes. The rejection also represented the ex-
pression of a fundamental loss of confidence in the EU and its institutions. 
The “Project Europe” had become incomprehensible to many European 
citizens and therefore reached its limits of acceptance and legitimacy.
12 
People also increasingly questioned the necessity of further European inte-
gration, especially in the absence of positive results in the fields perceived 
as most important (i.e. employment).
13 The Center for European Policy 
 
11  G. Kuhle, and J. Mathias, „Wege aus der Verfassungskrise – Die EU nach den ge-
scheiterten Referenden in Frankreich und den Niederlanden“, integration (3), 2005, 
p. 257-261. Paper can be found at www.iep- berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09 
_Publikationen/integration_2005/Jopp-Kuhle.pdf (retrieved on 10.12.07). 
12  U. Diedrichs, and W. Wessels, „Die Europäische Union in der Verfassungsfalle? 
Analysen, Entwicklungen und Optionen“, integration (4), 2005,  p. 287 – 306. Paper 
can be found at www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website /09_Publikationen/integration 
_2005/Diedrichs-Wessels.pdf (retrieved on 10.12.07). 
13  J. A. Emmanouilidis, „Die Zeit der Entscheidung: Optionen, Erfolgsvoraussetzun-
gen und Fahrplan für ein neues EU-Primärrecht“, CAP Analyse (1), 2007. Paper 
can be found at www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Analyse-2007-01.pdf (re-
trieved on 28.11.07). Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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Studies (CEPS) described the situation with: “Legitimacy in the public eye 
is not only transported by institutions alone. Outcome is also crucial.”
14 
Hence, what induced the French and the Dutch to ultimately reject the Con-
stitutional Treaty? In the European Commission’s post-referenda Euro-
barometer surveys, three main types of dissatisfaction can be identified in 
both the French and Dutch results: (1) political and (2) economic level, and 
an overall (3) integration fatigue (see Appendices I and II). In addition, the 
lack of information and communication also seem to have contributed to 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Political Dissatisfaction 
In both countries, the people took advantage of the referendum to voice 
their disappointment with their respective governments. The presidential 
election in 2002 was the most influential factor in the negative attitudes 
towards the French government. With the unexpected presence of the ex-
treme right wing candidate, Le Pen
15, in the second round of the elections, 
the majority of voters supported Chirac, as a way to block the victory of the 
extreme right wing even though they had not previously been proponents of 
Chirac’s UMP. As a result, the policies carried out by the government in 
2005 did not exactly reflect citizen’s expectations and the European consti-
tutional referendum turned out to be in large part a way for voters to ex-
press their frustration.  
In addition, the political and public debates leading up to the French refer-
endum, exposed different opinions even within the opposition socialist 
party, PS.
16 While the party’s position was to promote a vote in favor of the 
Constitutional Treaty, an opposing voice arose in the former Prime Minis-
ter Laurent Fabius who encouraged citizens to vote “no”. For the Socialist 
 
14  CEPS. “The paradox of European Democracy- reflections on a “Plan D” for the 
EU”, CEPS Commentary, 19.02.07. Commentary can be found at 
www.ceps.eu/Article. php?article_id=474 (retrieved on 10.12.07). 
15  Jean-Marie Le Pen is the leader of the extreme right-wing party “Front National.” 
16  The PS, or Socialist Party, is the main left wing party in the French political land-
scape. In 2005, at the date of the election, the PS was the main party of opposition 
to Jacques Chirac’s right wing party, the UMP, or “Union for a Popular Move-
ment.” Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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Party, a potential liberalization process that would follow an Anglo-Saxon 
model, less focused on social welfare presented a real fear of the changes 
that could be brought about by the Constitution.  On the other side, the ex-
treme right wing party denounced the Constitution as a text that would fa-
cilitate the accession of Turkey to the EU. Given the negative opinions and 
the absence of a harmonized position among parties, a climate of apprehen-
sion and a feeling of distrust toward the EU quickly developed, which 
eventually led to the collective “no” in May 2005.  
In the Netherlands, the center-right coalition led by Prime Minister Jan Pe-
ter Balkenende was not heavily supported by the Dutch due to cuts in pub-
lic spending. In addition, many citizens were still bitter for not having been 
consulted over the adoption of the euro, which they blamed in 2005 for the 
increase in their cost of living. Thus, their decision to reject the Treaty had 
less to do with the text itself but rather more with the reaction against the 
political elite.  
The Economic Dissatisfaction 
In comparison to France, the economic dissatisfaction in the Netherlands 
played a rather minor role, according to the post-referenda Eurobarometer 
reports.
17 In 2005, France had been experiencing a period of economic re-
cession. Two categories of citizens particularly expressed their concerns 
about unemployment levels: 1) young people whose unemployment rate 
was already high, and 2) middle aged workers, who traditionally have a 
greater difficulty in finding new jobs as compared to their younger coun-
terparts. In addition, the Eurobarometer reported that 31% of the ‘No’ vot-
ers thought that the ratification of the European Constitution would have a 
negative impact on employment and would lead to outsourcing of jobs to 
new Member States.
18 Moreover, the argument that “the Constitutional 
 
17  According to the Eurobarometer, only 7% of Dutch nationals had been influenced 
by the negative repercussions on employment levels and relocation of Dutch com-
panies outside the borders of the Netherlands. Eurobarometer, “The European Con-
stitution: post-referendum survey in the Netherlands”, June 2005, p. 15. 
18  Cf. Eurobarometer survey “The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in 
France”, June 2005. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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Treaty did not go far enough in securing a “social Europe” embodied reser-
vations of the French.
19 As a result, the state of the economy and high un-
employment rates were both influential factors in the decision to vote 
against the Constitutional text.  
Integration Fatigue 
According to the Eurobarometer,
20 integration fatigue in France was not the 
main cause of the negative vote. Only 6% of voters feared Turkish acces-
sion in the near future, and only 3% expressed concerns over a new 
enlargement wave.  
In the Netherlands, however, several integration-related issues nurtured the 
debate. The question of the accession of Turkey and Eastern European 
countries, coupled with the suspicions of a possible increase in immigration 
or the relocation of jobs to new Member States, were important 
considerations for the Dutch. In addition, voters were concerned about a 
decreasing influence of the Netherlands in an ever growing European 
Union and apprehended the possible loss of national identity in a uniform 
and global EU. 
Lack of Information and Communication 
In France, it seemed the lack of informed voters did little to orientate vot-
ers’ decisions towards casting the ‘No’ side. In the beginning, “the referen-
dum started out as almost a non-issue, but within six months, it skyrocketed 
in the public awareness”.
21 Debates flourished and a Eurobarometer survey 
for France shows that French voters believed they had at least a minimum 
 
19  R.L. Nielsen, and L.L. Olsen, “Why did the French reject the European Constitu-
tional Treaty?”, Working Paper (26), Centre for European Studies, University of 
Southern Denmark, 2006,  p. 14. 
20   Eurobarometer survey, “The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in 
France”, June 2005,  p. 18. 
21  A. Grosskopf, Why non and nee to the EU constitution? Reconsidering the shock of 
the Dutch and French Referenda, Department of Political Science, Long Island 
University, C.W. Post Campus, 2007, p.7. Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
12   
knowledge regarding the Constitution’s content.
 22 However, interestingly, 
the debate remained largely focused on national concerns, while European 
issues held a secondary position. Additionally, the term “constitution” fur-
ther exacerbated the debate, as the French perceived this new label as a 
threat to national sovereignty and to their French identity.
23  
In the Netherlands, a large number of voters seemed to know very little 
about the content of the Constitutional Treaty.
24 This may have been due to 
the fact that the Constitutional text was not available for the Dutch citizens 
until the final days of the debate. Also, the Eurobarometer survey following 
the referendum showed that the lack of information had contributed to the 
rejection of the document, with 32% of all ‘No’ voters indicating this rea-
son.
25  
In both France and the Netherlands, the EU institutions were rather absent 
from the pre-referenda debate. The Commission correctly argued that the 
problems in communication were in large part due to the fact that the EU 
bodies had “focused largely on telling people what the EU does, and less 
attention had been paid to listening to people’s views.”
26 Although there 
was a growing perception at the time that the outcome of the votes would 
ultimately lead to a rejection of the Constitution, the EU institutions did not 
involve themselves in a communication campaign to clarify the nature and 
content of the Constitutional text.  
 
22   Eurobarometer survey, “The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in 
France”, June 2005, p. 9. 
23   L. Pech, Understanding the French No, National University of Ireland, Galway 
Faculty of Law, 2006, p. 4. 
24  Eurobarometer survey, “The Future Constitutional Treaty”, March 2005, p. 3. 
25  Cf. Eurobarometer survey, “The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in 
the Netherlands,” June 2005, p. 15. 
26   European Commission, “White Paper on a European Communication Policy,” 
COM(2006) 35, February 2006, p. 4. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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The Period of Reflection – Actions Taken up by the 
Commission 
The period of reflection, conceived by the heads of states and governments 
during the summer of 2005, was to address the issues surrounding the rati-
fication failure, and the Plan D (Democracy, Dialogue and Debate) project 
was intended to be the starting point of this process. 
The Commission presented Plan D in October 2005. Launched by Vice 
President for Institutional Relations and Communications Strategy Margot 
Wallström, the plan sought to make EU policies more easily understood, 
ensure EU institutions remain both accountable and reliable and establish a 
long-lasting link between the Union and its citizens. In addition, Plan D 
intended to serve as a listening exercise and establish a new starting point 
for a long-term democratic reform process with an ultimate goal of building 
the future of Europe based on the citizen’s needs and expectations. The 
plan had not been intended to be a “rescue operation” for the Constitution, 
but rather a stimulus toward a broad debate between EU institutions and 
citizens. 
The Commission structured Plan D in three phases. The initial phase in-
volved stimulating as much debate and discussion among Member States as 
possible. While the primary responsibility of this stage rested with the na-
tional governments, the Commission was expected to “help structure the 
debate, if necessary provide Member States with financial and organiza-
tional support.”
27 During the debates, several issues were raised, including 
the necessity of defining the role of the EU, how it functions, where its 
borders are, and issues concerning the economic and social development of 
Europe in general.  
The second stage of Plan D focused on the feedback process and intended 
to establish “a concrete road map for the future of Europe.”
28 A European 
 
27  EU Civil Society Contact Group, “Period of reflection on the Constitutional Treaty: 
state of play eight month ahead of the June Council”, 2006, p. 3.  
28  European Communities, “European Commission launches Plan D for Democracy, 
Dialogue and Debate”, Press Release 13.10.05. Article can be found at Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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Conference discussing the future of Europe outlined a report which sum-
marized the main issues and conclusions from national debates.  
In the final phase, the Commission proposed thirteen specific initiatives to 
stimulate a broader public debate, “to promote citizens’ participation and to 
generate a real dialogue on European policies.”
29 The primary focus during 
this phase included “an intensive series of visits by Commissioners to 
Member States, support for European citizens’ projects, a drive for more 
openness of Council proceedings, a stronger presence of Commissioners in 
national Parliaments, the creation of a network of “European Goodwill 
Ambassadors” to raise the profile of the European debate, and renewed 
support for projects to increase voter participation.”
30  During this phase, 
the Commission worked in close cooperation with several EU institutions, 
namely the European Parliament.  
Beyond executing its Plan D initiative, in February 2006 the Commission 
drafted a White Paper on European Communication Policy designed to 
meet the shortcomings identified during the Constitutional Treaty ratifica-
tion process. The White Paper established a new communication approach 
which shifted from an institution-centered to a citizen-centered strategy ap-
proach.
31  The paper, entitled “A Citizens’ Agenda – Delivering Results for 
Europe,” identified and recommended specific actions to take so that com-
munication could be improved and citizen dialogue could be increased.
32 
These actions included: 1) defining common principles (i.e. right to infor-
mation and freedom of expression, diversity and participation); 2) empow-
ering citizens through the improvement of civic education, connecting 
citizens with each other and public institutions; 3) working with the media 
and new technologies to develop the national, regional and local dimen-
sions; 4) continuing to understand European public opinion through use of 
Eurobarometers; and 5) fostering cooperation among Member States, EU 
 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1272 (retrieved on 
03.03.08). 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
31   European Communities. “White Paper on a European Communication Policy” 
White Paper, 2006, p. 2. 
32  Ibid. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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institutions, regional and local authorities, political parties and civil society 
organizations.  
In addition, the Commission established an action plan in May 2006 to ad-
dress citizens’ concerns about sovereignty, efficiency, security and identity 
regarding EU enlargement and globalization. In the introduction of the 
communication, entitled “A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for 
Europe,” the Commission declared that the EU and its institutions must re-
spond to the challenges of globalization. “EU citizens want a greater under-
standing of, and say in, what the EU does and how it does it. They see the 
EU as important, but remote. The Constitutional Treaty is intended to help 
bridge the gap…but citizens want the EU to function effectively, now.”
33 
In the wake of the Constitutional crisis, the Commission responded by 
helping to identify the motivations behind the rejection of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and to outline possible initiatives to serve as solutions to those 
issues. 
Contributions of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament heavily defended the Constitutional Treaty and 
considered the ‘No’ votes to be a sign of general dissatisfaction within the 
Union, as opposed to a rejection of the constitutional reforms themselves. 
The EP concluded that the outcome of the referenda provided further evi-
dence of the growing general detachment of citizens from the EU integra-
tion process. In response to this challenge, the EP affirmed that these 
“specific concerns and worries should be addressed.”
34 It saw its chance to 
position itself as the spearhead of the European renewal process during the 
reflection period.
35  
 
33  European  Commission,  “Communication  from the Commission to the European 
Council—A Citizens Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe,” 2006. 
34    Euractiv, “Constitutional Treaty: the reflection period”, www.euractiv.com 
01.06.07. 
35  Cf. M. Bauer, A. Metz and S. Seeger, Der Plan D der Europäischen Kommission 
und die Reflexionsphase zur Verfassung und Zukunft der Europäischen Union, 
2005. Paper can be found at www.cap.lmu.de/download/2005/ CAP-Aktuell-2005-
03.pdf. Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
16   
In January 2006, the EP adopted a resolution on the period of reflection 
which was based on the Duff-Voggenhuber report.
36 The resolution high-
lighted initiatives concerning broader public debates by organizing parlia-
mentary forums through the EP, national parliaments, and the European 
media sources. The resolution also referred to several options which sug-
gested scrapping the constitutional project and beginning a new document 
from scratch. In the end, the general feeling was that positive results could 
come from the reflection period. Thus, the Constitutional Treaty would be 
preserved and the public would be more involved in the debate and forma-
tion process. In its communication as of May 2007, the European Parlia-
ment concluded that the Parliamentary Meetings “have shown a general 
recognition that the Constitutional Treaty would provide the European Un-
ion with an appropriate framework to meet the challenges that it faces, as 
well as the realization that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a new 
IGC to agree on proposals that were either radically different or superior to 
those agreed on in 2004.”
37 
One of the major EP accomplishments was the organization of a series of joint 
parliamentary conferences “in order to stimulate the debate and to shape, step 
by step, the necessary political conclusions.”
38 These biannual conferences on 
the “Future of Europe” between the EP and the national parliaments covered a 
broad range of issues. In May 2006, the first inter-parliamentary forum was 
held and organized by both the EP and the Austrian Presidency. The initial goal 
was to provide the European Council with recommendations on how to effec-
tively react to the constitutional crisis. In the end, the forum failed to provide 
any meaningful results, but the majority of participants considered the Consti-
tutional Treaty to be a viable means for further discussion.  
During the EP debates, several MEPs provided input and specific sugges-
tions on how to solve the complex constitutional issue.  For example, And-
 
36  European Parliament. “The period of reflection: the structure, subjects and context 
for an assessment of the debate on the European Union”, EP Report 
2005/2146(INI), 2005. 
37  European Parliament, “Draft Report on the Roadmap for the Union’s Constitutional 
Process,” Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Publication No. 2007/0000 (INI), 
17.04.07.  
38  European Parliament. “The period of reflection: the structure, subjects and context 
for an assessment of the debate on the European  Union”, EP Report 
2005/2146(INI), 2005. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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rew Duff, a Liberal MEP from the UK, had proposed various plans to save 
the most important parts of the Constitution. “Cherry-picking” was also 
another method proposed, but German Social Democrat MEP Jo Leinen 
warned against such behaviors, as the removal of elements would open up 
the entire Treaty package and lead to more contentious negotiations. Some 
critics of the treaty process, including MEP Nigel Farage from the UK, 
thought the dustbin was the place where the Constitution belonged. How-
ever, it was clear that the majority of MEPs supported the continuation of 
the ratification process and carried the hope that the Constitutional Treaty 
would enter into force in 2009.  
Also during this period, national political parties had been trying to include 
the “European dimension” in their internal debates and electoral campaign-
ing. In doing so, the parties suggested that the Union would give greater 
priority to cultural and educational policies. The EP published ‘European 
Papers,’ which covered many of the prominent issues facing the Union and 
were thought to be a basis for deliberations of the joint parliamentary fo-
rums. These actions underlined the need for a strict timetable with a clearly 
articulated objective regarding the Constitutional progress, as well as the 
need to measure public opinion. As the only European institution directly 
elected by the people, the EP, as argued by Bauer, Metz and Seeger, has a 
natural interest in increasing the acceptance of the citizens for the European 
integration project and to act as the arena for public political exchange.
39 
Therefore, the goal of the EP was to be heard not only by European elites, 
but also by European citizens in general.  
The Role of the European Council During the Reflection Period 
At the European Summit in June 2006, Member States agreed that the nec-
essary steps for the continuation of the reform process should be taken in 
2008, early enough to reach an agreement before the EP elections in 2009. 
The mandate for a roadmap, as well as procedural steps and a content out-
 
39  M. Bauer, A. Metz and S. Seeger, Der Plan D der Europäischen Kommission und 
die Reflexionsphase zur Verfassung und Zukunft der Europäischen Union, 2005. 
Paper can be found at www.cap.lmu.de/download/2005/ CAP-Aktuell-2005-03.pdf. 
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line of the revised treaty, was given to Germany, who was taking over the 
Presidency in January 2007.
40   
Despite being the initiator of the “period of reflection, clarification and dis-
cussion”, the European Council could not agree on a common position due 
to the dissent which existed among its Member States. The Belgian Presi-
dency’s concluding remarks on in June 2006 stated,  
“After last year´s period of reflection, work should now focus on delivery of 
concrete results and implementation of projects. The European Council agrees 
to a two track approach. On the one hand, best use should be made of the pos-
sibilities offered by the existing treaties in order to deliver the concrete results 
that citizens expect. On the other hand, the Presidency will present a report to 
the European Council during the first semester of 2007, based on extensive 
consultations with the Member States. This report should contain an assess-
ment of the state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional Treaty and ex-
plore possible future developments.”
41 
Therefore, both the Nice Plus and Constitutional Minus camps were able to 
be assuaged at the ministerial level. In this regard, the incoming German 
Presidency inherited a roadmap with high expectations and was ultimately 
tasked with finding a way out of the Constitutional dilemma. Despite these 
challenges, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was able to accomplish a 
great deal. First, the German Presidency was able to settle the main politi-
cal conflicts (i.e. including the UK’s ‘red lines’ and Polish inflexibility) in 
order to reach a joint declaration.
42 Second, the existing text remained the 
main point of reference for all talks and therefore 90% of the text of the 
Constitutional Treaty can now be found in the Lisbon Treaty.
43 Finally, 
disagreement over several controversial points of the Treaty had been re-
solved before the IGC.  It is, however, notable that despite the inclusive 
wording of the Berlin Declaration (i.e. “We, the citizens of Europe”) and 
 
40  See section 5 for a more detailed analysis on the EU Council Presidencies’ actions 
during the reflection period.  
41   Cf. European Council 15./16. June 2006, “Presidency Conclusions”, 10633/1/06 
REV 1, p. 16. 
42  Cf. S. Kurpas, and H. Riecke, “Is Europe back on track? Impetus from the German 
EU Presidency,” CEPS Working Document (273) July 2007, p.10. Paper can be 
found at http://aei.pitt.edu/7574/01/Wd273.pdf (retrieved on 03.03.08). 
43  Ibid, p. 13. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
 19
the ambitious action plan of the Commission (Plan D and Citizens’ 
Agenda), parliamentarians, civil society and the public were hardly in-
volved at all.
44 Even so, the EU heads of state and government signed the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007. 
The Member States’ Efforts During the Reflection Period  
It had been expected that Member State efforts would be quite extensive 
during the reflection period. However, it seemed the debates at the Member 
State level concerned Europe’s future, rather than the Constitutional Treaty 
itself. Activities included regaining citizens’ confidence in the EU, better 
informing citizens, providing input in the debate on the EU’s communica-
tion strategy, ensuring better rates of participation of citizens in the EU de-
bate, and debating the substance and challenges raised by EU policies and 
their relevance for citizens’ concerns (such as globalization and enlarge-
ment).
45 
Some Member States, such as the UK, organized a major conference on 
subsidiarity and proportionality in November 2005 to focus on specific is-
sues on the agenda and tailored debates to different national concerns. 
NGOs were also particularly involved in informing and educating EU citi-
zens with the support of Member State governments, and in doing so, en-
couraged citizens to participate in hearings, conferences and European 
forums. In 2005, no debates took place in Germany and Poland because of 
national elections and the lack of euro-political issues in the campaigns.
46 
Premier Balkenende of the Netherlands announced a dialogue with the pub-
lic, but it failed to materialize due to diverging views among the Dutch par-
liament, government, and political parties.
47   
 
44  Ibid, p. 11. 
45  Cf.  www.euractiv.com/29/images/Message%20to%20June%20Summit%202006 
_tcm29-155743.pdf (retrieved on 03.03.08). 
46  B. Einhäuser, „Wie nutzt Europa die Reflexionsphase? Eine erste Bilanz seit dem 
Gipfeltreffen im Juni 2005,“ KAS-Länderberichte, Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung, p. 
8. 
47  B. Lippert, and T. Goosmann, “The State of the Union: Period of Reflection or the 
Sound of Silence,” Analysis 02.01.2006, Real Instituto Elcano, p. 5. Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
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Debates on national issues were held in Member States such as Spain and 
Portugal, but transnational elements often failed to come to the surface in 
such cases. Latvia criticized the missing coordination between the EU and 
national programs, especially the lack of information on actions that were 
intended by the Commission
48. Additionally, few reports explicitly refer to 
the trans-national and multi-level dimensions of the debates.    
The type of activities undertaken by Member States encompassed diverse 
initiatives such as improving government work on EU-related issues, orga-
nizing conferences and direct consultation of citizens, as seen in Austria, 
creating informative and educational websites, working on better engage-
ment of civil society in the decision-making processes, as done in France, 
various information and educational projects, as completed in Italy and the 
Netherlands, and public opinion surveys, as experienced in Luxembourg. 
In January 2006, the Institut für Europäische Politik in Berlin published its 
report EU-25 Watch, which included analyses from across Europe regard-
ing the difficulties being faced at the Member State level. Difficulties high-
lighted in the report included, heterogeneity and diversity of preferences; 
the widening gap between citizens and their Member State governments; 
the success, or not, of the wait-and-see approach that was beginning to 
characterize the period; enlargement fatigue; and the fact that integration is 
being increasingly driven by external factors and not internal grand Euro-
pean projects that capture peoples’ minds.
49 In addition, there was a distinc-
tion between how “old” and “new” Member States acted during the period 
of reflection. As outlined in the EU-25 Watch report, a widespread percep-
tion existed that the crisis had been a clash between “old” members, many 
of whom were in the grip of economic and political crises, and the newer, 
more dynamic Member States, whose economies were doing relatively 
well.  
On one level, the attempt to include European citizens in the policy-making 
process can be traced back to the October 1993 inter-institutional declara-
 
48  EU Civil Society Group, “Period of Reflection on the Constitutional Treaty: State 
of play eight months ahead of the June Council”, 2006, p. 3. 
49  B. Lippert, and T. Goosmann, “The State of the Union: Period of Reflection or the 
Sound of Silence”, Analysis 02.01.2006, Real Instituto Elcano, p. 5. Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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tion on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity. With its Plan D the 
Commission contributed to the reflection by reinforcing a very general PR 
scheme whose inherent objectives have been to: listen, i.e. to include the 
European citizen into the input-output model of politics; create ownership 
of EU policies according to their expectations; and to “populize” the Euro-
pean project. 
Currently, it is impossible to evaluate to what extent the enhanced commu-
nication with citizens will have an impact. However, the first step to further 
include and involve civil society in a more representative democracy model 
has been taken. Furthermore, the structures and mechanisms established 
during the implementation of Plan D may prove to be of use in further 
treaty initiatives.  
Academic Contributions 
The ratification crisis and reflection period had been continuously moni-
tored by the various research institutes and think tanks that are committed 
to analyzing European integration. Academic discussions and publications 
covered the constitutional process from start to finish. The following ab-
stract presents a brief overview of the main focus in publications of some 
key research institutes in Europe.
50 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), in Bonn (Germany) 
monitored the process leading to the Constitutional Treaty and published an 
interdisciplinary commentary on the Constitution.
51 Furthermore, ZEI has 
dealt intensively with the motives that led to the ratification crisis and the 
opinions that were held in the various Member States. 
The French and Dutch ‘No’ votes were analyzed in detail and background 
information was given.
52 A research priority was to identify possible out-
 
50  It should be emphasized that this overview does not constitute an exhaustive list of 
research institutes focused on European integration. 
51  M. Höreth, C. Janowski, L. Kühnhardt, „Die Europäische Verfassung. Analyse und 
Bewertung ihrer Strukturentscheidungen,“ Baden-Baden, 2005. 
52  C. Janowski, „Das Referendum über die Europäische Verfassung in Frankreich“, 
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comes of the ratification crisis and possibilities for institutional changes 
that arose through the negative feedback in the Member States.
53 A key as-
pect of the argumentation was the comprehensive discussion regarding the 
future of the European Union. Possible outcomes of the reflection period 
and alternatives for the Constitution were discussed and published accord-
ingly.
54 In addition, the goals and achievements of the German EU Presi-
dency in 2007 were another focal point of ZEI’s publications.
55 
Similar academic contributions can also be found in the publications of the 
Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels (Belgium), includ-
ing the analysis of the German EU Presidency in 2007
56 and the alterna-
tives which could substitute the failed European Constitution.
57 Variations 
in the academic research as compared to ZEI can be found in the field of 
Community instruments supporting and fostering public debates and com-
munication on European integration. Conditions for the functioning of the 
EU’s Citizens’ Agenda
58 as well as the Commission’s White Paper for 
Communication were both topics dealt with in publications.
59 One of the 
research priorities of CEPS was to examine the establishment of public 
awareness and the mechanisms to better understand the structure and func-
tioning of the EU. It is quite clear that CEPS was also concerned with the 
concrete Community activities to implement a reflection period.  
 
53  L. Kühnhardt, „Die Chance der Krise“; Rheinischer Merkur 23.06.05. 
54  B. Matthieu, D. Popovic, and D. Presova, “Reconstructing Europe. Two Alternative 
Proposals for a European Constitution”, Discussion Paper, Center for European In-
tegration Studies, 2007. 
55  A. Marchetti, and M. Zimmek, „Annäherung an Europa. Beiträge zur Deutschen 
EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007“, Discussion Paper, Center for European Integration 
Studies, 2007. 
56  S. Kurpas, and H. Riecke, “Is Europe back on Track  ? Impetus from the German 
EU Presidency”, CEPS Working Document (273), Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2007. 
57  R. Baldwin, “Plan B”, CEPS Policy Brief (74), Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2005. 
58  E. Guild, “Making the EU’s Citizens’ Agenda Work”, Policy Brief (122), Centre for 
European Policy Studies; 2007. 
59   S. Kurpas, S. Brüggemann, and C. Meyer, “The Commission White Paper on 
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The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European Univer-
sity Institute (EUI) in Florence (Italy) monitored the Constitution drafting, 
the ratification crisis and subsequently the reflection period. Through an in-
depth analysis of the Constitution draft, one major publication series sup-
ported the finding of a solution for the EU’s future integration challenges.
60 
Future prospects for European integration and its legal framework were 
also evaluated and discussed. EUI launched a comprehensive project con-
cerning the development of the Constitution,
61 the content of the draft, the 
consequences of the negative referenda and future options for the document 
itself and European integration in general. The project was comprised of 
seminars, speeches, publications and presentations involving experts from 
different backgrounds. The academic activities were pursued under the 
overall umbrella “A European Constitution: Retrospective and Pros-
pects.”
62 Finally, the EUI contributed to the work of the “Action Commit-
tee for European Democracy” which was involved in the public debates 
during the reflection period and provided logistical, technical and scientific 
support.
63 
Researchers involved in the Garnet Network of Excellence tried to identify 
factors leading to the crisis which the European integration process had to 
overcome.
64 The respective researchers characterized the crisis that fol-
lowed the French and Dutch referenda as 'distinct from the preceding 
one.'
65 They drew this characterization because the crisis combined a de-
 
60  G. Amato, H. Bribosia, and B. De Witte, “Genesis and Destiny of the European 
Constitution”, Paper, European University Institute, 2007. 
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European University Institute, 2003. 
62  “A European Constitution: Retrospective and Prospects”, www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ Re-
search/ Institutions/Index.shtml (retrieved on 03.03.08). 
63    Further details concerning the “Action Committee for European Democracy” 
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64  Garnet is a research network on “Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regula-
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cline in both the public support for the EU as well as in the motivation of 
some European leaders. According to some authors, a possible solution was 
to revitalize the integration process by identifying common political objec-
tives while modifying the institutional structures as much and as far as nec-
essary.
66 Possible solutions and recommendations pertaining to the French 
and Dutch referenda
 and their impact on the political and social level were 
also envisaged.
67 
The  Centre d'Etudes Européennes (CEE) of Sciences Po Paris (France) 
analyzed the reactions after the French referendum with a focus on the so-
cial dimension of the French 'Non'. This approach tried to explain and iden-
tify motives for the outcome of the votes, such as internal social tensions, 
disparities among voters
68 and lack of information.
69 A political agenda 
which contains priorities such as employment, education, enlargement and 
political reform was considered to give scope to the social and political de-
bate in saving the ratification process.
70  
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Ber-
lin (Germany) has also dedicated a great deal of work to the Constitutional 
crisis and Europe's options to move forward. Possible solutions were (1) 
maintaining the status quo by improving the Treaty through dialogue, (2) 
individual reform steps in a “sub-constitutional manner” or (3) separating 
the Member States that are unwilling to ratify the Treaty.
71 The SWP’s 
works concluded that ultimately the success would depend on the willing-
ness and capacity of political parties to find consensus and to implement 
reforms.  
 
66  Ibid. 
67   C. Lesquesne, “Referenda and European Integration: A Misguided Procedure”, 
Garnet Policy Brief (1), 2005. 
68  M. Lazar, “Le grand soir n'aura pas lieu”, Le Monde, June 2005. 
69  E. Friedberg, “Referendum: NON, le debat n'etait pas exemplaire!”, Tribune Libre, 
June 2005. 
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The publications issued by the Institute of European Politics (IEP) in Ber-
lin (Germany) first sought to analyze the reasons for and consequences of 
the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands. Generally, these failures 
were viewed as a serious crisis in the integration process. It had been rec-
ognized, however, that the negative referenda were not an expression of 
dissatisfaction with the Constitutional Treaty in general, but rather as an 
expression of underlying problems.
72 These difficulties needed to be ad-
dressed before taking further steps. Taking the anxieties and fears of the 
citizens into account was considered crucial.
73 While early publications 
also tried to explain the value-added of the Constitutional Treaty,
74 later 
publications attempted to suggest possible ways out of the crisis, mostly 
focusing on what should be done with the Constitutional Treaty and to 
what extent certain elements could be used for further integration. An 
analysis of proposed package deals showed that all possibilities seemed to 
bear a high risk of failure.
75 But they seemed to have in common the con-
clusion that retaining the Constitutional Treaty was not a feasible solution. 
Although the crisis did not need to be viewed as a disaster for the integra-
tion process, there was considerable disagreement about solutions for the 
future.
76 
The articles published by the Centre for Applied Policy Research (CAP) in 
Munich (Germany) regarding the reflection period analyzed the different 
initiatives taken by the European Parliament and the Commission in detail. 
They concluded that the citizens of Europe should be placed in the center 
of all debates. Furthermore, they examined how far these initiatives could 
contribute to solving the legitimacy problem of the EU by focusing in par-
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ticular on the potential contribution of Plan D.
77 Compared to several other 
institutes, CAP also considered the integration process to be in a severe cri-
sis. The debate about the future of the European Constitution nonetheless 
received a new impulse from the debates initiated by the Austrian Presi-
dency. The most prominent lines of argument and competing paradigms 
which surfaced during these debates had also been analyzed by CAP.
78 
This brief overview of some key research institutes in Europe demonstrates 
the ongoing study of the process that the European Union went through fol-
lowing the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands. The think tanks 
previously mentioned have closely monitored this period and they all seem 
to be interested in the underlying reasons that led to this situation. All au-
thors agreed on the severity of the crisis and provided several solutions that 
could solve the integration dilemma. The overall  opinion was that the 
European integration process had come to a crossroads and that alternative 
scenarios needed to be carefully assessed in terms of advantages and disad-
vantages. A great deal of work suggested possible ways out of the crisis, 
not only in a theoretical manner but also in very practical terms, such as 
comprehensive projects entailing seminars, speeches, conferences and pub-
lications to facilitate the involvement of citizens in the European integra-
tion process. 
From Public Debate to Negotiations Behind Closed 
Doors 
The period of reflection was not only a period of academic debate and dis-
cussions with the public, but also a period of efforts to find solutions for 
future treaty reforms in order to overcome institutional inefficiencies. 
Hagemann and Missiroli stated in May 2007: “The political debate has now 
resumed, slowly but surely, thus bringing an end to the ‘pause’ and trigger-
 
77  M. Bauer, A. Metz, S. Seeger, “Der Plan D der Europäischen Kommission und die 
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ing [at last] some real ‘reflection’.”
79 On the one hand, citizens discussed 
the future of Europe from a social and political point of view, while on the 
other hand, the institutions and national governments were bargaining and 
negotiating with each other about the contents of the Constitutional Treaty.  
Member States’ Conflicting Positions 
Member States’ positions on how the reflection period should be used and 
how the EU should move forward differed greatly. British Prime Minister 
Blair presented his idea of how the reflection period should be used in a 
speech at Oxford University when he stated that it would be necessary to 
find “the policy answers” for the challenges Europeans are faced with and 
“then let institutional change help deliver them; rather than the other way 
round.” This was the kind of pragmatic approach that the Commission also 
proposed. But Blair expressed his critical view of the mainly elite-driven 
constitutional process when he said: “Instead of bold policy reform and de-
cisive change, we locked ourselves in a room at the top of the tower and 
debated things no ordinary citizen could understand.”
80  
After the French voted “No,” there was no chance for French politicians to 
openly foster the ratification process in Europe. They pursued, moreover, 
the strategy of a deeper integration process on the basis of the existing trea-
ties. President Chirac also proposed enhanced cooperation among the coun-
tries of the Eurozone, which would mean nothing less than a two-speed 
Europe. This idea was also supported by the Belgian Prime Minister Ver-
hofstadt, who also indicated that he had severe doubts as to whether or not 
the Constitution would ever be successful. Rather, he promoted the idea of 
a “United States of Europe” with enhanced cooperation in certain fields. 
The Netherlands’ head of government Balkenende took an even more nega-
tive position, and the Polish government went as far as to ask to stop the 
ratification process. The leader of the ruling Polish party, Jaroslaw Kaczyn-
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ski, even argued that the reflection period would only extend the crisis. On 
the other hand, there were countries that still showed a strong commitment 
to the Constitution, such as Finland and the new EU member Estonia, 
whose parliament ratified the Constitution in May 2006. Spain, Hungary, 
Cyprus, Slovenia, Portugal, Austria and the Czech Republic also wanted 
the Constitution to survive. Germany supported the idea of the Commission 
to first tackle urgent problems like unemployment and showed openness to 
changes in the constitutional text.
81  
As a counterbalance to the diverging positions held by individual Member 
States, the Member States holding the Presidency in the Council that were 
tasked with the advancement of the reflection period and future Treaty re-
form played a significant role in the Constitutional process.  
British Presidency 
Taking over the EU Council Presidency from Luxembourg in July 2005, 
the British Presidency intended to set the scene for a broad debate on the 
future orientation of the Union with no particular timetable attached. The 
European Union and its Member States needed time to debate how to react 
to the constitutional impasse; whether to continue the ratification process or 
to put it to a halt. The lack of citizen support not only in France and the 
Netherlands, but also in other skeptical countries such as Great Britain, had 
to be analyzed in order to respond to the crisis. However, it may be stated 
that the first Presidency after the referenda took a particularly slow start to 
initiate discussion, putting the issue off to the upcoming Austrian Presi-
dency.
82 Member States were exhibiting a “wait-and-see” approach, with 
Germany and Poland focusing on their respective non-euro-political na-
tional election campaigns,
83 Dutch politics being deeply divided on the is-
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sue
84 and many other countries, such as Spain and Portugal, generally being 
absorbed by their national agenda. In this context, it was Latvia who actu-
ally criticized the missing coordination between the EU and national pro-
grams.
85    
Austrian Presidency 
Nevertheless, EU Member States launched a number of information and 
communication activities following the call for a period of reflection by the 
European Council. The Austrian Presidency was asked to conduct a ques-
tionnaire and to come up with a summary reflecting the findings of those 
initiatives. In its interim report on national debates on the future of Europe, 
the following key findings were highlighted: 
•  Member States used a multi-level approach to address citizens. Even 
though the audiovisual initiatives played a key role, the internet was 
also identified as a highly potent instrument, which however, re-
quires specific use. 
•  Providing especially teachers and journalists with an education on 
Europe was favoured by many Member States due to the multiplier 
effect of such activities. 
•  Concerning the topics discussed, citizens seemed to perceive the 
European agenda as an extension of their national agenda. As a re-
sult, priorities and subjects differed widely between Member States. 
This made it impossible to come up with some key messages com-
mon to all EU citizens. Even so, common concerns seemed to be: 
employment, globalization, security, environment, EU enlargement 
and other international challenges.
86  
 
84  Cf. B. Lippert, and T. Goosmann, “The state of the Union: Period of r or the sound 
of silence”, Paper, Institut für Europäische Politik, 2006, p. 5. 
85  Cf. EU Civil Society Contact Group, “Period of Reflection on the Constitutional 
Treaty: State of play eight months ahead of the June Council”, 2006, p. 3.  
86  Cf. Council of the European Union. “Report on Member States’ information and 
communication activities during the reflection period” 9701/1/06 REV 1, 24 May 
2006. Report can be found at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st09/ 
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People seemed to have very little knowledge about the way decisions are 
taken on the EU-level, which went along with a certain degree of mistrust 
in the decision-making process. In spite of this, citizens expected actions 
regarding their core interests - quality of life, unemployment, security and 
environmental concerns - to be taken at the European level.  
Under the Austrian Presidency’s influence, first steps were taken to address 
the Constitutional impasse leading up to the Council Conclusions of June 
2006, the one year deadline of the reflection period. As alternative propos-
als and positions began to take shape among the Member States, it was de-
cided to follow the Commission’s proposal of extending the reflection 
period until 2008. New impetus for a settlement was expected under the 
German Presidency beginning in January 2007 and Germany was mandated 
to submit a report outlining possible avenues for the future.  The entire is-
sue was to be resolved by the end of 2008 under the French Presidency at 
the latest.
87 
Finnish Presidency 
During the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006, no further con-
crete steps were taken, however the groundwork was laid for real move-
ment on the issue of what to do about the Constitutional Treaty and it 
looked as if the period of reflection might be finally coming to an end. The 
Finnish government held discussions with all Member States on the future 
of the Constitutional Treaty, and as noted by Council President Matti Van-
hanen, there was a definite “change in atmosphere.”
88 In a shift from people 
being in a “dream world” and not wanting to give the elephant in the room 
active consideration, European leaders and decision makers began to seri-
ously think about how to move ahead with the Constitutional Treaty.  
 
87   Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 15/16 June 2006. 
Presidency Conclusions”, 10633/1/06 REV 1, CONCL 2, 17 July 2006. Conclusion 
can be found at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/ 
en/ec/90111.pdf (retrieved on 28.11.07). 
88  Speech given by Finnish EC President Matti Vanhanen to the EP, 18th December 
2006. Speech can be found at www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/speeches/ 
vko51/en_GB/178743/ (retrieved on 28.11.07). 
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The German Presidency: The Turning Point 
When Germany took over the rotating EU presidency and officially ended 
the period of reflection on 17 January 2007, the Constitutional issue still 
represented a complicated challenge. Due to its image of “motor of Euro-
pean integration,” Germany was seen as the most likely player to find a so-
lution. However, it was feared that if Germany were to fail, the EU would 
experience a severe backlash and lose even more credibility. The German 
government was thus under intense pressure. A fast-paced program of ne-
gotiations and initiatives had been set up with a view to outline the content 
of a renegotiated treaty that the European Council could agree on in June 
2007.  
During the German presidency in the first half of 2007, the EU celebrated 
the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. On the occasion on 25 March 
2007, the EU produced the “Berlin Declaration” which, in addition to stat-
ing common European values, looked back on EU achievements as well as 
forward to new challenges. Although the declaration did not make direct 
reference to the Constitution, it stated that it wanted to place the EU on a 
“renewed common basis.”
89 In her government declaration in June 2007, 
German chancellor Angela Merkel herself claimed that the clear commit-
ment of the 27 Member State governments to finding a new common basis 
by 2009 was a very important step in overcoming the institutional dead-
lock, as it caused needed time pressure.
90 
The German Presidency engaged in bilateral consultations with the Euro-
pean governments in order to establish their respective positions. The se-
crecy of the talks, while being criticized for aggravating the transparency 
problem, was defended as a necessary tool to achieve agreement in the end. 
Any involvement of the press in the negotiations would arguably have 
 
89  Cf. European Communities. “Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
the signature of the Treaties of Rome”, 25. March 2007. Speech can be found at 
www.europa.eu/50/ docs/berlin_declaration_en.pdf (retrieved on 10.12.07). 
90  Cf. A. Merkel, “Government Declaration of the German Chancellor: Outlook on the 
European Council of 21/22 June 2007”, 14 June 2007. Speech can be found at 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2007/2007-06-14-
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stirred up an open controversy between Member States, making a compro-
mise impossible.
91  
Each Member State had been asked to appoint two representatives, or 
“sherpas”, who would be in charge of the direct but confidential negotia-
tions with the German presidency. The aims were (1) to promote a clear 
definition of stances by the Member States and (2) to increase trust among 
sherpas to facilitate negotiations and the adoption of common stances. The 
process was exacerbated by the British and Polish negotiators who drew off 
their red lines with respect to fundamental rights, foreign policy and the 
judicial system on the one hand and the call for a ‘square root of the popu-
lation’ in Council voting on the other.
92  
Opposing Models for Treaty Reform  
The task of alleviating conflicts could not have been much more challeng-
ing. The positions on the Constitution were divided, with large Member 
States fundamentally opposing each other on how to proceed. There were 
basically two different concepts and models for Treaty reform. 
One approach advocated not taking the Constitutional Treaty, but rather the 
Treaty of Nice as the basis for future reform steps. Politicians as well as 
scholars have declared the Constitution ‘dead’ and claimed that people 
should look for creative solutions elsewhere. Britain, France, the Nether-
lands, the Czech Republic and Poland all adopted this “Nice-Plus” position, 
despite differing reasons and backgrounds.
93 
The EP and the Member States that had already ratified the Constitutional 
Treaty promoted the idea of basing a ‘Reform Treaty’ on the Constitution. 
This approach was also referred to as “Constitutional Minus.” As they were 
 
91  Cf. S. Kurpas, and H. Riecke, “Is Europe back on track? Impetus from the German 
EU Presidency”, CEPS Working Paper (273), 2007. 
92  For an in-depth discussion: S. Kurpas, and H. Riecke, “Is Europe back on track? 
Impetus from the German EU Presidency”, CEPS Working Paper (273), 2007. 
93  D. Göler, M. Jopp, „Die europäische Verfassungskrise und die Strategie des "langen 
Atems"“, integration (2) 2006, p. 91-105. Article can be found at www.iep- ber-
lin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/ integration_ 2006/GoelerJopp.pdf (re-
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convinced that the Constitutional Treaty was the optimal outcome, since it 
had been developed as the smallest common denominator of the 25 mem-
bers and then Candidate States, they did not want to go back to cumber-
some and time-consuming negotiation and voting processes in order to 
reinvent the European reform wheel.
94 
Reaching a Compromise 
Despite strong resistance on a number of issues, particularly from Poland 
and the UK, an agreement was hammered out during the German presi-
dency at the European Council Meeting of June 21 to 23 2007. A mandate 
was presented for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to take place in 
October to draft a final successor to the now defunct Constitutional Treaty. 
As previously indicated, it was deemed necessary to negotiate the treaty 
with as little publicity as possible. Furthermore, with the exception of Ire-
land, it was set to be ratified by parliamentary vote. Negotiations under the 
German Presidency and the envisioned ratification procedures were highly 
controversial. Instead of sticking to the Convention method of democratic 
openness, the return to “the old days of inter-governmental talks behind 
closed doors”, as well as the strategy of “avoiding referenda at all costs” 
were considered necessary to move the Union forward. It may be argued 
that an EU-wide consultative ballot on the same day would have been more 
adequate to demonstrate accountability and political tact, but in the end, the 
lack of transparency in the process seemed to be the trade-off for institu-
tional efficiency and legitimacy. At this point it should be stressed that “EU 
documents and treaties are usually not written with the primary purpose of 
impressing public opinion or being transparent for ordinary citizens.”
95 
They are written to “satisfy the bureaucrats and political representatives of 
27 nation states, and to reconcile the complex interests of the many pres-
sure groups across Europe.”
96 In fact, “the European Union is fully ac-
cepted by national governments, and increasingly by civil society in the 
 
94  Ibid. 
95    Euractiv, “If EU Referendums Are Taboo, What Then?” www.euractiv.com 
03.10.07. 
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form of NGOs and interest groups, as well as by most elite opinion.”
97 On 
the other hand, the EU is “not yet an integral part of national political sys-
tems, which is why national electorates are not fully engaged in or commit-
ted to its ways.”
98  
Content of the Lisbon Treaty 
Following the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, the European Council 
that met on 18 and 19
 October in Lisbon adopted a draft Reform Treaty 
(“Lisbon Treaty”) expected to be ratified in 2009 to replace the failed Con-
stitutional Treaty. The most important modifications of the Lisbon Treaty 
compared to the Constitutional Treaty are the following
99: the Lisbon 
Treaty is not a single text as suggested by the Constitutional Treaty, but 
will amend the two existing treaties, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the latter be-
ing replaced by the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU).
  
In the Council, QMV will be extended to 40 additional policy areas by 
2014, in an attempt to reduce the blockage-threat and to lead to a more effi-
cient decision-making process. The most contested policy issues will, how-
ever, remain under unanimity voting (i.e. taxes, social security, Common 
Foreign and Security Policy). In addition, double-majority voting will be 
introduced. A "qualified majority" is reached when a majority of all 
Member States (55%) who represent a majority of all citizens (65%) vote 
in favor of a proposal. The new system is designed to yield higher transpar-
ency and greater legitimacy by incorporating slightly stronger population 
weights. Furthermore, a reduction of the number of Commissioners (from 
27 to 18) and members of the European Parliament (from 785 to 750) will 
 
97  Ibid. 
98  Ibid. 
99  The following section is based on: Giuliani, “Understanding the European Council 
in Lisbon and the Reform Treaty”, European Issues (76), Foundation Robert Schu-
man, 2007. A more in-depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty regarding the questions 
of transparency, efficiency and democracy can be found in: M. Höreth, and J. Son-
nicksen, “Making and Breaking Promises. The European Union under the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, ZEI Discussion Paper C181, 2008.  Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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start in 2014. The influence of the European Parliament in the legislative 
process will increase with the extension of the co-decision procedure, cur-
rently the most frequently used legislative method. A permanent Council 
Presidency of two and a half years will be introduced, designed to set more 
coherent priorities and to deliver more continuity. Whether there will be a 
conflict of competence between the Commission President and the Euro-
pean Council President has yet to be seen. 
The “European Foreign Minister” changed into a “High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, replacing the current 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the EU External Relations 
Commissioner. 
Further changes include the enhanced control of subsidiarity by national 
parliaments which will take part in the European legislative procedures, the 
obligatory nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in all Member 
States except the UK and Poland and the possibility of popular initiative by 
means of the right to petition. Finally, the three pillars will be merged 
transforming the EU into a legal entity within the Treaty on European Un-
ion (TEU). 
To achieve consensus on these changes, several concessions had to be 
made: the UK's withdrawal from some common policies (opt-out clauses in 
police and legal areas, Charter of Fundamental Human Rights), the delay of 
the new weighting of votes in the Council until 2014, the application of the 
‘Ioannina Compromise’ (allowing a blocking majority), the elimination of 
the “market, where competition is free and undistorted”-clause (without 
considerable legal effects) and the withdrawal of European symbols. 
Thus, while the Lisbon Treaty maintains most of the reforms envisaged by 
the Constitutional Treaty, marking a vast improvement in the functionality 
and workability of the union, some reform steps were not taken due to di-
verging national interests, in particular those of the UK and Poland. Due to 
the character of national constitutions and the concern about maintaining 
national sovereignty, the European symbols (i.e. the flag and anthem) had 
to be removed and the Charter of Fundamental Rights only referenced in-
stead of included in the Treaty’s text. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty remains Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
Tunick (eds.) 
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somewhat lacking in terms of the expectations and hopes expressed in the 
Constitutional Treaty by many advocates of reform.  
It must be noted here that after the ‘No’ votes to the Constitutional Treaty 
and the subsequent struggle over an adapted version of the latter during the 
reflection period, the Lisbon Treaty is first and foremost a political com-
promise. Despite an apparent shift in Euro-enthusiasm among the people 
and policy makers alike, the reform treaty ‘saves’ the core of the institu-
tional reforms as outlined in the Constitution, most importantly the change 
of voting procedures in the Council, the permanent presidency and the es-
tablishment of the ‘High Representative’.  
Conclusion 
In summary, during the reflection period the EU attempted to resolve its 
constitutional difficulties by pursuing several strategies that would provide 
sufficient time for Member States to further the Constitutional debate and 
garner enough support to continue the ratification process. While the broad 
discussions provided an additional opportunity for the heads of state and 
government to establish a consensus regarding the future of Europe, the 
Member State populations and national parliaments were unable to contrib-
ute to the degree that they had wished. On the one hand, citizens discussed 
the future of Europe from a social and political point of view, while on the 
other hand, national governments were bargaining and negotiating with 
each other about the contents of the Constitutional Treaty—a process 
which lacked transparency throughout the duration of reflection period. 
As demonstrated in this paper, the Constitutional Treaty originated through 
a desire among European political elites to consolidate the existing treaties 
and governing documents into a single text, as well as to enhance effi-
ciency, transparency and democracy. Although receiving overwhelming 
support from MEPs during the non-binding, but highly politically symbolic 
vote, the Treaty met resistance from significant portions of the population, 
namely in France and the Netherlands. However, direct criticism of the 
Constitutional Treaty played the least important role the voters’ decisions Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
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to vote ‘No.’
100 As identified through public opinion polls in the second 
part of the analysis, disenchantment over domestic issues, expressions of a 
fundamental loss of confidence in the EU and its institutions, as well as a 
questioning of the necessity of further European integration, were identi-
fied as the root causes for the negative votes. It is difficult to evaluate the 
impact of EU institutions’ projects on contributing to the solution of the 
Constitutional crisis, yet it is clear that some initiatives (i.e. Plan D) have 
resulted in an enhanced discourse between EU institutions and citizens. In 
this context, one could conclude that these developments have led to im-
provements in advancing democratic elements. As outlined in the fourth 
section, the reflection period was monitored by various research institutes 
committed to analyzing European integration. Contributions of these aca-
demic institutes ranged from research publications and discussions to larger 
projects which incorporated seminars, speeches, and presentations involv-
ing European integration experts. Ultimately, negotiations to solve the 
Constitutional crisis occurred behind the “closed doors” of Member State 
governments, as illustrated in the fifth section of this paper. Instead of 
sticking to a method of democratic openness, the EU returned to “the old 
days of inter-governmental talks behind closed doors.” These negotiations 
produced the Lisbon Treaty, which can be categorized as a political com-
promise on the one hand, since it retains the core elements of the Constitu-
tional Treaty, but on the other hand, omits several original provisions.   
As a final point, the period of reflection did not have a fundamental impact 
on the negotiations which led to the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty, the ac-
tions taken by Member States and EU institutions were certainly positive, 
in the sense that for the first time, the integration process attempted to in-
corporate the needs and wants of the citizens of Europe. 
 
100 G. Kuhle, and J. Mathias, „Wege aus der Verfassungskrise – Die EU nach den ge-
scheiterten Referenden in Frankreich und den Niederlanden“, integration (3), 2005, 
p. 257-261. Paper can be found at www.iep- berlin.de/fileadmin/website/ 
09_Publikationen/integration_2005/Jopp-Kuhle.pdf (retrieved on 10.12.07). Anna Niemann, Sonja Ana Luise Schröder, Meredith Catherine 
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0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
The draft goes too far
Opposition to further enlargement
I am against Europe / European construction
I do not see what is positive in this text
Loss of national sovereignty
Lack of information
Does not want Turkey in the EU
Too complex
Not enough social Europe
Oppposes the president of the republic / the …
Economically speaking, the draft is too liberal
Other
The economic situation in France is too weak /  …
It will have negative effects on the employment … Motivations of No votes in France (%)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Recovering from the Constitutional Failure 
 39
 
Appendix II 
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